For signalling to be honest the handicap principle claims that signals must impose fitness costs so that only the best individuals can afford the most exaggerated signals. The cost of signalling in terms of reduced survival decreases, however, towards the end of an individual's lifetime, which can induce an increase in signalling effort as a terminal effort. I show for the three-spined stickleback, Gasterosteus aculeatus, that a decrease in survival prospects through impaired condition leads to an increase in red nuptial coloration that makes the signal less reliable as an indicator of male parental ability. Males in poor condition with a large signal sometimes cannibalized all the eggs they received, probably to start a new breeding cycle with a higher energy reserve. However, the inclusion of socially imposed costs of signalling through male-male competition during courtship increased the honesty of the signal, as some males in poor condition and of poor parental ability decreased their signal expression. Some cheaters still occurred, but the signalling system was honest on average. This implies that socially imposed costs are important in the maintenance of honest sexual signalling. Dishonesty may occur under favourable conditions when the cost of signalling is reduced. This emphasizes the importance of considering the environmental conditions experienced by individuals when investigating the evolution and maintenance of honest sexual signals.
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One of the debated issues of sexual selection theory is the evolution and maintenance of honest sexual signals of mate quality. This is especially intriguing in species where there is no direct physical limitation on signal expression and individuals can decide how much to allocate to it. According to Zahavi's (1975) handicap principle, for signalling to be honest in these cases, it should be costly in terms of reduced survival or fecundity and the cost should increase with the expression of the signal. If individuals of high quality then experience lower costs, or higher benefits for a given level of signalling, the optimal balancing of costs and benefits of signalling should ensure that individuals of high quality develop more exaggerated signals than individuals of low quality (Grafen 1990a, b; Getty 1998) .
For individuals that breed several times during their lifetime, signalling could thus be subjected to a life history trade-off between present and future signalling effort. This could lead to some individuals cheating if they invest proportionally more in present signalling and less in future signalling than others (Kokko 1998). This might be the case when individuals within a population differ in their future reproductive value. Individuals with a low prospect of survival might invest relatively more in present reproduction if they have the necessary resources than individuals with a higher future reproductive value. This possibility has been detected in the three-spined stickleback, Gasterosteus aculeatus, where food-deprived, poor-condition males develop more red carotenoidbased nuptial coloration than males in good condition (Hosking 1996; Baube 1997; Candolin 1999b) . This is most likely due to poor-condition males having a lower probability of survival and future reproduction than males in good condition and therefore having less to lose from signalling at a high level. This possibility is further emphasized by the finding that an increased cost of signalling in terms of enhanced predation risk increases the difference in redness between males in good and poor condition, as males in poor condition reduce their red coloration less and take greater risks than males in good condition when exposed to predators (Candolin 1999b).
